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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Edward Ray Christensen appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance. Specifically, 
Christensen appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress 
statements he made to his parole officer and law enforcement during a parole 
compliance search of his residence. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Parole Officer Guiberson received information that Christensen, a parolee 
on her supervision caseload, had been involved in illegal activities, specifically, 
selling methamphetamine. (Tr., p.14, Ls.5-8.) Officer Guiberson contacted the 
Idaho State Police to request assistance (Tr., p.16, Ls.3-11) and went to 
Christensen's house to conduct a home visit (Tr., p.14, Ls.2-4). 
Officer Guiberson entered Christensen's house, followed by two ISP 
officers, and began talking to Christensen while the troopers readied to start a 
"probation search" in the living room. (Tr., p.49, Ls.6-9.) Officer Guiberson 
advised Christensen she was there because of concerns he was violating the 
terms of his parole by selling methamphetamine, including relaying the 
information that a woman who had just left his house told the officers that 
Christensen had sold her methamphetamine. (Tr., p.22, Ls.20-25.) Christensen 
told Officer Guiberson that "he had sold it to her." (Tr., p.22, L.25.) Officer 
Guiberson let Christensen know they were going to search his house and asked 
if there was anything illegal. (Tr., p.24, Ls.22-24.) Christensen admitted to 
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Officer Guiberson there was "methamphetamine under the couch." (Tr., p.24, 
Ls.24-25.) "[T]he couch was lifted, and methamphetamine was found." (Tr., 
p.25, Ls.1-2.) 
Trooper Skinner joined Officer Guiberson and Christensen in 
Christensen's kitchen to talk to him about the methamphetamine. (Tr., p.49, 
Ls.10-13.) Christensen was never handcuffed and sat on a stool in his kitchen 
about his suppliers, his level of sales, and his personal methamphetamine use. 
(Tr., p.25, Ls.3-5.) The home compliance search took less than an hour. (Tr., 
p.29, L.17.) 
That state charged Christensen with possession of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine, and with being a persistent violator of the law. 
(R., pp.39-42.) Christensen filed a motion to suppress asserting his "Fifth 
Amendment Right against self incrimination was violated in that [he] was not 
advised of his Miranda Rights prior to any questioning when he was in custody 
and not free to leave." (R., p.64.) The district court denied Christensen's motion 
to suppress, finding "a reasonable person in Christensen's circumstance would 
not have felt his freedom of action was curtailed to the degree associated with a 
formal arrest." (R., p.92.) 
Christensen entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress. (R., pp.166, 170-171; Tr., p.71, L.17 - p.72, L.17.) The state 
withdrew the persistent violator enhancement and agreed to recommend a 
sentence of four years fixed followed by one year indeterminate. (R., pp.166, 
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170-171; Tr., p.71, Ls.20-22.) The district court sentenced Christensen to a five-
year unified term with the first four years fixed. (R., p.177; Tr., p.88, Ls.17-18.) 
Christensen timely appealed. (R., pp.184-187.) 
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ISSUE 
Christensen states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it held that Mr. Christensen was not 
entitled to a Miranda warning and denied his motion to suppress? 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Christensen failed to show error in the district court's determination 
that his statements were not obtained in violation of his Miranda rights? 
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ARGUMENT 
Christensen Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Christensen argues that the district court erred by denying his request to 
suppress "statements made in response to questioning by law enforcement 
officers and evidence discovered in the home because he was not given Miranda 
warnings prior to being questioned while he was in custody." (Appellant's brief, 
p.7.) Because the evidence shows Christensen was not in custody at the time 
he was questioned, his argument fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The determination of whether police are required to provide Miranda 
warnings presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 
848, 854, 11 P.3d 44, 50 (Ct. App. 2000). The appellate court reviews the trial 
court's findings of fact for clear error, but gives free review to the application of 
constitutional principles to those facts. & 
C. Christensen Has Failed To Demonstrate That He Was In Custody 
Equivalent To Formal Arrest At The Time He Made The Statements He 
Seeks To Suppress 
Before an individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, the 
interrogating officers must advise the individual of certain rights, including the 
right to remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). 
However, "police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to 
everyone whom they question." Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,495 (1977). 
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Miranda requires warnings only when the individual being questioned is in 
custody. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468. 
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that "custody" for 
purposes of Miranda turns on whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on 
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. California 
v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983); see also State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 
576-77, 225 P.3d 1169, 1171-72 (2010). A mere investigative detention does 
not trigger the requirement of Miranda warnings. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 
420, 440 (1984); State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 576-77, 634 P.2d 435, 438-39 
(1981 ). The test for determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes 
of Miranda is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the interrogation, there was a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement 
of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125; see 
also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). When applying this test 
the "only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position 
would have understood his situation." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; State v. Doe, 
137 Idaho 519, 523, 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002); State v. Albaugh, 133 Idaho 
587, 591, 990 P.2d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 1999). Factors that may be considered 
include the time and location of the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the 
nature and manner of the questioning, and the presence of other persons. 
Albaugh, 133 Idaho at 591, 990 P.2d at 757; State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 
117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992). "The burden of showing custody 
rests on the defendant seeking to exclude evidence based on a failure to 
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administer Miranda warnings." State v. Silver, 155 Idaho 29, 32, 304 P.3d 304, 
307 (Ct. App. 2013). 
Because the "in custody" test for Miranda requires a restraint on freedom 
associated with formal arrest, a person subject to a routine traffic stop or an 
investigative detention based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 
although not "free to leave," is ordinarily not in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420; State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 634 P.2d 435 (1981). 
In Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005), the Supreme Court reiterated its 
holding in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981 ), "that officers 
executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority 'to detain the 
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted."' Such a 
detention during the execution of a search warrant represents only an 
incremental intrusion on personal liberty when the search of a home has been 
authorized by a valid warrant. 1 Summers, 452 U.S. at 703. Such detentions are 
1 Law enforcement officers may also detain occupants of premises during a 
parole compliance search without placing the occupants "in custody" for 
purposes of Miranda. Sanchez v. Canales, 574 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2009) 
("We hold, pursuant to Muehler v. Mena ... that officers may constitutionally 
detain the occupants of a home during a parole or probation compliance 
search.") (overruled in part by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 
2012) (overruling Sanchez and other cases "to the extent they hold that 'there is 
no constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes of the 
fourth amendment. ... These cases conflict with the Supreme Court's holding 
that 'parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers.' Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 ... (2006).") 
Inasmuch as the overruling of Sanchez by King does not affect Sanchez's 
holding that officers may constitutionally detain occupants of a home during a 
parole search - vis-a-vis a probation search - the rule set forth in Sanchez 
applies to Christensen because his home was subjected to a parole compliance 
search. 
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"surely less intrusive than the search itself' and "substantially less intrusive than 
an arrest." 1sL at 701-702. Absent extenuating circumstances such as the use of 
handcuffs or force, "a person detained during the execution of a search warrant 
is generally not in custody" for purposes of Miranda." State v. Young, 136 Idaho 
711, 719, 39 P.3d 651, 659 (Ct. App. 2002). This is so despite the fact that 
officers, incident to the detention, necessarily control the person's movements to 
a certain degree. 1sL at 720-721, 39 P.3d at 660-661. 
"[W]hether a person's detention during the execution of a search warrant 
rises to a degree associated with formal arrest must be determined on a case-
by-case basis." 1sL at 719, 39 P.3d at 659. Factors to be considered by the 
court include the time and location of the interrogation, the conduct of the 
officers, the nature and manner of the questioning, and the presence of other 
persons. State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117-118, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367-1368 
(Ct. App. 1992). It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate that she was in 
custody. State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577, 225 P.3d 1169, 1172 (2010) ("We 
join the vast majority of courts that have considered the issue and hold that the 
burden of showing custody rests on the defendant seeking to exclude evidence 
based on a failure to administer Miranda warnings."). 
Under these standards even imprisonment, standing alone, may not be 
enough to trigger the requirement of Miranda warnings. The custody inquiry 
under Miranda "depends upon whether [custody] exerts the coercive pressure 
that Miranda was designed to guard against - the danger of coercion that results 
from the interaction of custody and official interrogation." Maryland v. Shatzer, 
8 
559 U.S. 98, 113 (2010) (emphasis original, brackets and internal quotations 
omitted). Custody to the degree associated with formal arrest alone is not 
enough to create the necessity of Miranda warnings, but is merely a "necessary 
and not sufficient condition" to finding a requirement of Miranda warnings. kl 
Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States has concluded that "lawful 
imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a crime does not create the coercive 
pressures identified in Miranda." kl (holding that inmate who invoked right to 
silence could be re-interrogated after passage of time and Miranda waiver 
despite lack of break in custody). 
The facts of this case fully support the conclusion that Christensen was 
not in custody at the time he made incriminating statements. The testimony at 
the suppression hearing established the discussions with Christensen took place 
in a relaxed atmosphere in the kitchen of his own home where Christensen freely 
discussed his methamphetamine sales and personal usage. (Tr., p.24, L.22 -
p.25, L.9, p.28, Ls.19-21, p.33, Ls.2-5, p.34, L.10.) Christensen was never 
placed in handcuffs. (Tr., p.25, L.6, p.33, L.2, p.34, L.9.) Although there were 
other officers on scene (Tr., p.27, Ls.1-4), the testimony established there were 
only three officers inside Christensen's house for the parole compliance search 
and only two of them interviewed Christensen (Tr.,p.49, Ls.6-9). The entire 
encounter took between 45 minutes and an hour. (Tr., p.29, Ls.15-18.) 
Christensen argues the state cannot claim there was no evidence of an 
overbearing interrogation because "five officers arrived at [his] home at the same 
time, and at least three of them entered his home right away." (Appellant's brief, 
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p.9 (footnote excluded).) This statement, however, is not an accurate description 
of Christensen's circumstances at the time he made the challenged statements.2 
Although there appear to have been five officers present at the scene, 
Christensen was questioned only by his parole officer and one ISP trooper and 
there is no evidence whatsoever that the other officers were even close, much 
less that they surrounded him or caused a coercive environment. In addition, as 
noted above, the evidence clearly established Christensen was not handcuffed 
at any point during the encounter. Because Christensen fails to even address 
his custody level at the relevant time, he has failed to show error in the district 
court's determination that Christensen was not in custody for purposes of 
Miranda. 
Christensen asserts he was in custody for purposes of Miranda because 
"his status as a parolee changed the entire equation" and the court failed to 
consider this. (Appellant's brief, p.10.) Christensen appears to argue that by 
virtue of being on parole, he was imprisoned and therefore necessarily entitled to 
Miranda warnings. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-12.) As discussed above, 
imprisonment alone is not sufficient to trigger Miranda warnings. Christensen 
fails to take into consideration the totality of the circumstances surrounding his 
statements made to his parole officer during a parole compliance search of his 
2 Although Christensen's brief does not indicate the specific statements he finds 
violative of his rights, a review of the transcript of the suppression hearing points 
to statements made to Officer Guiberson and Trooper Skinner when the three of 
them were alone in the kitchen. 
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home. It is clear from the evidence that Christensen was comfortable and felt 
unthreatened while having a discussion in his own kitchen with his parole officer 
and a state trooper about Christensen's involvement in methamphetamine use 
and sales in an obvious attempt to avoid a harsher charge than the possession 
of a controlled substance he ultimately received. (See generally, Tr., p.13-42.) 
Contrary to Christensen's assertion on appeal, application of the law to 
the facts established at the suppression motion hearing shows that, although he 
was detained, he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when he was 
interrogated. As the district court correctly found, "during Christensen's in-home 
interview, his freedom of action was not limited to the degree associated with 
formal arrest." (R., p.94.) Consequently, the officers were not required to 
administer Miranda warnings before questioning him. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
decision affirming the judgment of conviction. 
DATED this 19th day of Mar 
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REED P. ANDERSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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